The riding and taxpaying public still need to see the detailed construction schedule submitted by the construction contractor. It should have already been reviewed and approved by Amtrak with input from both NJTransit and LIRR, whose operations will be directly impacted by the work. The schedule would provide the weekly, monthly and yearly detailed construction project interim milestones, along with sequencing of work that justify the promised 2027 completion date.

Don’t be surprised if the project completion date slips into 2028 or 2029. The budget may also increase. There will be contract change orders during construction. They may be due to unforeseen site conditions, last minute requests by Amtrak operations, maintenance or other departments, LIRR and NJT. Construction contractors sometimes submit claims for additional financial reimbursement. These claims may be based upon additional work not included in the original contract.

To preserve existing service, some LIRR rush hour Penn trains will be canceled or combined or sent to Grand Central. This results in overcrowded Penn trains with insufficient seating capacity. Some riders will end up standing in the vestibules and aisles. Conductors will be unable to walk through trains and check tickets. Until this work is over, it will be impossible to guarantee safe and reliable on-time service with the same current level of service, including a seat, during a.m. and p.m. peak trips to and from Penn Station for LIRR commuters.

During the past eight years the projected cost of work for the tunnel repair has increased 300% to $1.6 billion. Even with work starting in 2024, there is no guarantee that repairs to the two most damaged tubes will be completed by 2027.

Will Amtrak have sufficient track outages and force account support (Amtrak employees) to meet the promised 2027 completion date? The same Amtrak resources are also committed to other projects along the Northeast Corridor between Washington and Boston for years to come. Three of these in the New York area include the $1.6 billion Portal North Bridge, $3.1 billion for MTA Metro-North’s Bronx East Penn Station Access and the $16.8 billion Gateway Tunnel Hudson River Phase One projects.

And this does not include ongoing routine maintenance at Penn Station Newark, Penn Station New York, the Hudson and East River tunnels, $2 billion Maryland Susquehanna River Bridge, $4.7 billion 1.4 mile Baltimore Potomac Tunnel, $827 million Connecticut River Bridge, other stations, tracks, bridges, tunnels and facilities along the Northeast Corridor. How can Amtrak provide sufficient numbers of employees to work on these key state of good repair and system expansion projects while supporting work on the East River Tunnel at the same time?

Only a review by an independent engineer of Amtrak’s 2025 and future year’s annual Master Force Account and Track Outage Plans could validate that they have the resources to support future East River Tunnel work, along with all the other major capital projects in the Metro New York area and Northeast corridor.

Amtrak has previously stated that it will require each of the two tubes damaged by Sandy to be out of service for a year and half to advance project work. The other two tubes will also need work to bring them up to a state of good repair. With only three of four tubes available for the next few years, there will be a 25% reduction in Penn Station access and capacity. Besides LIRR, NJTransit, along with Amtrak, need significant access to move equipment to and from the Sunnyside Yards via the same tubes. This facility is used by both Amtrak and NJT for midday and overnight storage to position equipment for rush hour and off peak service.

Having only three of the four tubes running inbound mornings and evening rush hours means very tight spacing between trains. One tube is shared by the LIRR, NJT and Amtrak for reverse train movements with equally tight spacing during rush hours. Penn Station is currently operating at 100% capacity during rush hours. Right now, if one of the four tubes is temporarily out of service, the result is numerous delays, cancellation and combining of trains.

Under Amtrak’s plan, that will be the condition for a few years. Amtrak’s East River Tunnel rehabilitation will result in one of four tubes being removed from service 24/7. If a train stalls in one of the three remaining tubes, thousands of commuters will be late.

There is also the West Side Penn Station yard used by LIRR for midday storage of trains. During the evening eastbound rush hour, the LIRR runs equipment from this facility. Full eastbound evening peak service is dependent upon westbound trains arriving at Penn Station. This equipment is turned around to make a second trip east bound, so everything is impacted.

To preserve existing service, it is obvious that some LIRR rush hour trains will be canceled or combined. Others will be diverted to the Grand Central. This will add to travel time for those with West Side Manhattan destinations who prefer Penn Station. This results in overcrowded trains with insufficient seating capacity for those still serving Penn. Until this work is over, it will be impossible to guarantee safe and reliable on-time service with the same current level of service, including a seat, during morning and evening peak trips to and from Penn Station for LIRR commuters.

Reduced East River Tunnel capacity also makes it difficult to add previously promised new services This includes Metro-North East Bronx New Haven line Access to Penn Station via the Hell Gate Bridge (whose start date has now been delayed from late 2027 to a 2028 date yet to be made public) and 40% overall increase in reverse peak service as a result of East Side Access to Grand Central.

Both Amtrak and NJTransit need access to the Queens Sunnyside Yards via the East River tunnels to support their own respective planned service increases. Going from four to three available East River tubes can only result in a significant capacity reduction. This translates to no increase in existing or new services until work on all four East River tubes is completed.

The LIRR 1960’s motto, “Line of the Dashing Dan,” should be changed to “Line of the Slow Moving Sloth” when it comes to completing East River Tunnel repairs as a result of damages from 2012 Superstorm Sandy 15 years later in 2027.

Penner is a transportation advocate, historian and writer who previously served as a former director for operations and program management at the FTA Region 2 New York Office.

For decades, some LIRR commuters transferred at either the Hunters Point, Long Island City or Woodside stations to the Flushing No. 7 subway to Grand Central. Between 1964 and 1965, the LIRR ran a shuttle bus between the Hunters Point station to GCT. Construction of the 63rd St. Tunnel began in 1969 and was completed by the late 1970s and then mothballed. There was no additional available funding to advance construction beyond the tunnel portals on either the Manhattan side to a new terminal or Queens side to link up with existing tracks in Sunnyside.

In 2001, while working for the Federal Transit Administration’s Region 2 office (which covers New York and New Jersey), I attended a meeting with the LIRR. They estimated a cost of $4.3 billion with completion by 2009. I counseled my FTA colleagues that the price tag would be $9 billion with a completion date of 2015. Ironically, people thought I was too pessimistic. The subsequent history would prove that I was too optimistic!

In 2006, the FTA approved a $6.3 billion project, capping the federal share at $2.6 billion. The MTA would have to cover any cost overruns. By 2016, the estimated cost at completion went up to $11 billion and the first day of passenger service slipped once more, to 2022. Today, the baseline cost is $11.6 billion not including financing and related “LIRR readiness projects.”

I argued in 2006 that the scope of work should include activities east of the Queens Harold Interlocking as part of the project budget. This work was essential to increase operational capacity for running the promised 24 hourly rush hour trains to Grand Central. They ended up classified as “LIRR readiness projects” carried offline from the main project. There are more than $4 billion in additional indirect costs for what is known as LIRR readiness projects to support ESA service.

These include the $2.6 billion Main Line Third Track, $450 million Jamaica Capacity Improvements, $387 million Ronkonkoma Double Track, $120 million Ronkonkoma Yard Expansion, $44 million Great Neck Pocket Track, $423 million for rail car fleet expansion and others that were necessary for full implementation of ESA.

Without these projects, the LIRR would lack the expanded operational capabilities to support both promised 24 rush hour train service to Grand Central along with a 40% increase in reverse peak and off peak service. Any honest transportation project cost allocation plan would include these $4 billion in expenditures. This would bring the real full cost of ESA to $16.6 billion.

Each time the project has been delayed since 2006 from the agreed upon completion date of 2013, the MTA had to keep its own construction management firm, independent engineering project management oversight firm, office of capital construction along with hundreds of LIRR force account and other employees on the payroll assigned to ESA. No one has made clear how much this cost the MTA during the life of the project.

Between 2006 and 2023, there were several generations of MTA chairs, LIRR and MTA office of capital construction presidents. All presided over numerous budget increases, construction delays and recovery schedules. The promised opening service date slipped on numerous occasions to December 2022.

Numerous project recovery schedules to offset delays in project progression failed. They included the resequences of work and repackaging of contracts into several smaller contracts when the bids came in several hundred million higher than the engineers’ forecasted cost estimate. This resulted in periodic changes of what is known as the critical path for the overall project construction schedule. It was like dominos. When one contractor fell behind schedule, it triggered delays for other contractors to advance their work.

The MTA has repeatedly increased the budget by billions, issued a series of project construction recovery schedules and pushed back the first day of service by ten years. The MTA blamed Amtrak for $1 billion in additional costs and delay. This was primarily due to Amtrak providing insufficient force account (its own employees) and track outages at the Harold Interlocking. Both were necessary for construction contractors and LIRR employees to complete work at that location.

The FTA had its own independent engineering project management oversight (PMO) consultant assigned to monitor the work and provide technical assistance to the MTA. On numerous occasions, they reported on budget increases, construction delays and recovery schedule failures in monthly reports distributed to senior MTA and FTA management staff. Often, the MTA would disagree. They claimed both the FTA and its PMO were incorrect or pessimistic. MTA leadership was reluctant to inform the governor of these changes. Like Russian generals during WWII, no one wanted to deliver Stalin the bad news. They were fearful of being sent to the Gulag.

It would average several months before the MTA could obtain clearance from the governor’s office. Only then would they publicly acknowledge what everyone close to the project already knew about cost increases and delays. When responses to construction project procurements would come in several hundred million above the engineers’ estimate, they would be divided up into smaller contracts. This resulted in 72 contracts to manage. Time was lost, change orders to contracts grew along with the cost to the MTA for oversight of so many contractors.

No one likes to acknowledge examples of project waste, fraud and abuse. A simple audit was performed 13 years ago by an accountant who reviewed a budget for train platforms being constructed under Grand Central Terminal. The accountant found that funding was provided under the project budget to pay for 900 workers, but could only find paperwork to justify 700 workers.

No one could explain what tasks the other unaccounted for 200 workers performed. These 200 potential phantom employees were being paid $1,000 per day. They were subsequently removed from the payroll. No one ever determined how long they were on the payroll or how much they were paid. There is no evidence that these lost dollars were ever recovered.

After all this time and money, what have we purchased? The single waiting room has only a 29 seat capacity plus seven stools for Wi-Fi connections to serve riders. Despite ample space, there are no benches on the platform and mezzanine levels to sit while waiting.

Why didn’t the MTA learn from the long lines at Penn Station’s restrooms? Under Grand Central there are only two men’s rooms with a total of 18 urinals and 13 toilets, two women’s rooms with a total of 25 toilets, one lactation room and two gender neutral restrooms. You better have a strong bladder to make it in time from the lower or upper level platforms and mezzanine before reaching a restroom.

As of now, none of the 25 retail spaces are open. How many months of lost revenue will be incurred until they are occupied? There are no provisions for advertising. Several million dollars were spent on art work. Funding would have been better allocated for enhancement of safety and security. Art work is fine for the eyes, but it generates no income. This space along with other walls on the platforms, mezzanine, concourse, escalator steps, seating and recycling bins could have been assigned to the MTA real estate department for advertising purposes.

In our new COVID-19 world, will there really be 160,000 riders utilizing ESA? How many years will it take before returning to pre-COVID ridership numbers? Less than 70% of pre-COVID ridership has returned to date. The MTA’s own independent consultant previously predicted that a return to 100% pre-COVID ridership may not occur until 2035.

Many continue to work from home part or full time rather than ride the LIRR daily. More people continue telecommuting. There will be fewer face-to-face meetings and conferences, with increased usage of Zoom and other teleconference technologies. Many Manhattan-based corporations are downsizing existing office space. Others are relocating employees to suburban offices closer to home. With all of that, what is the basis under our new post-COVID world to justify the promised new ridership numbers? Did the MTA and LIRR ever update their ridership modeling to validate promised increased ridership?

How many of the 72 ESA contracts will be closed out by tomorrow’s first day of service? There are still open contracts needing completion for all contract punch list items (to insure the contractors built the asset to meet design and engineering contract specifications), receipt of all asset maintenance manuals for any project components worth $5,000 or more under remaining open contracts, payments for outstanding bills, and release of contract retainage to contractors.

Some contractors may submit claims for additional reimbursement for work based upon delays attributed to insufficient track outages or force account support from both Amtrak and LIRR. It may be several more years before all 72 project contracts are closed out. At that point, ESA will really be 100% complete. Only then, will the final true project cost be determined.

Ten years after the original completion date of 2013, as promised in the 2006 FTA Full Funding Grant Agreement (which capped the federal share at $2.6 billion of a total $6.3 billion cost) plus $5 billion over budget not including $1 billion more for the cost of financing plus $4 billion in associated LIRR readiness projects for a total cost of $16.6 billion, LIRR commuters, taxpayers, funding agencies and transit advocates still deserve better.

When it comes to the history of East Side Access, the LIRR 1960’s motto “Line of the Dashing Dan” should be changed to “Line of the Slow Moving Sloth.”

Penner is a transportation advocate, historian and writer who previously served as a former director for operations and program management at the FTA Region 2 New York Office.

Having worked for 31 years for the FTA, Region 2, which covers New York and New Jersey, I know that this report was written by career professional FTA employees based in Washington, with input from New York Regional Office colleagues. Each proposed project is reviewed and ranked on the same series of questions and criteria, along with any updated information provided by the project sponsor. This includes progress to date in advancement of environmental review, design and engineering along with identification of matching local share.

New York and New Jersey elected officials want Washington to pick up half the tab for the $14 billion for Gateway’s first phase. This would pay for replacing the Portal Bridge (which has been delayed since the 1980s by several New Jersey governors along with Amtrak and was always a standalone project from Gateway), two new Hudson River tunnels and rehabilitation of two existing tunnels.

Local leaders are hypocritical in continuing to call for Washington to finance construction of Gateway, but refusing to contribute matching funding. Previous governors of both states found billions in hard cash for their local share to obtain FTA funding for other projects. These include NJTransit’s Hudson Bergen Light Rail Segment One ($992 million), Segment Two ($1.2 billion) and Secaucus Transfer ($450 million). The MTA did the same for LIRR East Side Access ($11.2 billion) and Second Ave. subway Phase One ($4.5 billion). None required federal loans.

Neither Gov. Cuomo nor Gov. Murphy has programmed significant funding in their current budgets toward local share for Gateway. Without real hard financial resources from Washington ($14.6 billion), NJ ($7.3 billion) and NY ($7.3 billion), how will the full $29 billion Gateway be paid for? A project can’t be financed by borrowing and fare surcharges alone.

There are other potential funding opportunities. NJT receives almost $1 billion and MTA $1.4 billion in yearly FTA formula funding outside of the New Starts process. Why not use some of that toward Gateway? Both can request the Federal Highway Administration transfer Congestion Mitigation Air Quality or other flexible funds to FTA in support of Gateway.

A recent increase in gasoline tax has provided Murphy with a robust State Transportation Trust fund. Why doesn’t New York establish one by raising the gasoline tax a few pennies per gallon? Murphy wants a portion of New York’s future congestion pricing tolling for trips his residents take to Manhattan. Why doesn’t he ask Cuomo to allocate 10% of these revenues toward Gateway, just as Cuomo has done for the Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North?

Amtrak has its own multi-billion capital program. Service on the Northeast Corridor between NYC and Washington actually makes a profit. How much hard cash is Amtrak contributing?

The Gateway project, which has grow by $9 billion over the past four years from $20 to $29 billion, is reminiscent of the ongoing MTA’s East Side Access to Grand Central. In 2001, the estimated cost was $3.5 billion with a completion date of 2011. In 2019, 18 years later it stands at $11.2 billion and could grow up to $12 billion with completion in 2022. Could Gateway do the same and become our New York version of the infamous Boston “Big Dig” by costing $40, $50 or even $60 billion when completed by 2038?

The Gateway Development Corp. reminds me of the character Wimpy who famously said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today.” Tuesday may never come for commuters and taxpayers who use NJT and Amtrak and need a new Hudson River Tunnel to be completed within their lifetime.

Penner is a transportation historian and advocate.